Week 08 - Public goods and externalities by Figini, Paolo
the public intervention in the destination
the fundamental economic problems for the destination are:
 the COORDINATION of the whole tourism product;
 the supply of VARIETY within the tourism product;
 to COMPLETE the tourism product through the supply of PUBLIC GOODS;
 to TACKLE EXTERNALITIES.
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the provision of public goods
The general framework for justifying the public intervention in the economy:
 The allocation bureau: when the market is unable to achieve the efficient 
equilibrium at the micro level.
 The stabilization bureau: when the market is unable to reach the optimal 
level of aggregate demand, employment and price stability (anti-cyclical 
policies);
 The redistribution bureau: to redistribute resources and income (taxation 
and provision of goods and services) according to equity criteria.
As far as tourism is concerned, although redistribution issues (in particular 
between residents and tourists) and stabilization policies (in terms of 
controlling employment and income effects of seasonality) can be relevant, 
the main activity is with regard to allocation.
The intervention stems from the complexity of the tourism phenomenon, driving 
to: (a) coordination problems; (b) market failures; (c) the key role played by 
public goods and common resources in the matrix of the tourism product
the provision of public goods
For public goods benefits are spread over the whole community, regardless of 
the individual act of purchasing. They are associated to strong positive 
externalities.
Technically, a public good differs from a private good (the standard good 
exchanged in markets) in two characteristics:
 The absence of rivalry in consumption: more than one individual can 
simultaneously benefit from the good without reducing the utility they get from 
consumption.
 The absence of excludability of benefits: if the good is made available, it is 
not possible, or not economically advantageous, to exclude consumers from 
the benefits. The non-excludability can be technical or economic.
public goods in the tourism sector
There are many public goods in the matrix of the tourism product (information over 
the Internet, the cultural heritage of the destination, even the whole city itself...)
Club goods are also key in tourism (swimming pools, museums, golf courses...)
Also mixed goods are important if, due to different types of congestion, a rivalry in 
consumption applies (traffic jams, crowded beaches...)
EXAMPLE - Should a statue by a famous artist be installed by the city council in 
the city’s main square?
Being in a public square, the sculpture would be accessible to everyone, without 
leading to problems of congestion (it would be a pure public good).
Assume there are only two families (A, B), both willing to support the installation of 
the sculpture for their enjoyment and because it constitutes a tourism attraction.
Hence, families have to choose between:
(a) the utility resulting from the provision of the statue, associated with less 
available income;
(b) the utility resulting from full income, associated with no artistic consumption.
public goods in the tourism sector (2)
The problem of economic policy is to determine the optimal level of social 
welfare for the community of families among the two alternative cases.
In the standard case of private goods, the solution is left to the market.
For the public good, since it is non-excludable and non-rival, it appears with the 
same value in the utility function of each consumer.
Let's assume that the availability of the statue in the square gives each family an 
increase in utility of 2, while the overall cost of the statue is 3.
In these conditions the community composed by the two families would receive a 
net benefit from the acquisition (=4-3; this is the Samuelson condition)
However, individual preferences must be revealed in a voting process.
Under these conditions (the typical case of the prisoner’s dilemma) the dominant 
strategy for both A and B  is to vote “NO”: inefficient outcome, also for tourism!
public goods in the tourism sector (3)
The inefficient solution stems from an economically rational behaviour of the 
private sector. Since each agent will be called to pay on the basis of their 
expressed willingness to pay, then it is rational to undervalue it.
This selfish behaviour is called free-riding and stems from the fact that the public 
good, once it is produced, is available to everyone.
Should each citizen behave this way, the result would be a lower quantity of the 
public good with respect to what is socially optimal: MARKET FAILURE
The public authority is called for intervention through:
(a) the direct activity of production;
(b) the allocation of the total cost through taxes.
One can expect, if the public administration does not intervene, a lower level of 
public goods in the tourism product of the destination.
As a consequence, the quality and the variety of the good diminishes, decreasing 
tourist’s satisfaction and the competitiveness of the destination.
Alternatively, if bottom-up coordination and cooperation arises, the solution of 
private provision of the public good is also possible.
public bads in the tourism sector
Public bads are the damages caused to the entire community, without the 
possibility of being excluded. They are the unwanted by-products of consumption 
or production activities.
Public bads are of interest for the tourism sector: pollution affecting the natural 
environment; deterioration of monuments and cultural cities, etc.
As in the case of public goods the maximization of individual goals leads to a 
socially inefficient outcome.
EXAMPLE – Consider two hotels, A and B, on the shores of a mountain lake;
Each hotel, in order to produce its own hospitality services, pollutes the lake and 
the forests.
Assume that the hotels can choose between two forms of using the environment:
(a) respect it, developing and managing an environmentally friendly “eco-hotel,”; 
(b) damage it, without sustaining clean-up costs.
What is the best strategy for each of the two hotels?
public bads in the tourism sector (2)
Since each hotel wants to get the highest profit, it is better for both to adopt 
strategy D, independently of what its rival decides: D is the dominant strategy.
The outcome is inefficient
The efficient outcome could be reached through an effective law of environmental 
protection (public solution) or with a binding commitment (private solution).
Such cooperative equilibrium would be beneficial to both hotels, more satisfying for 
tourists and more respectful to the environment.
externalities
Public goods and public bads are typical examples of externalities.
An externality is a benefit or a cost not transmitted through the price 
mechanism.
Externalities can be classified in:
(a) consumption externalities, when the consumption decisions of an agent 
affect the utility function of other agents, consumers, or firms;
(b) production externalities, when the production decisions of a firm affect the 
output of other firms or the utility of some consumers.
Another classification distinguishes between:
(a) positive externalities (external economies);
(b) negative externalities (external diseconomies).
EXAMPLE – Negative externalities of production: a manufacturing firm polluting 
the air and the lake where a hotel is located
externalities (2)
externalities (3)
The public correction is necessary, not only requested by tourism stakeholders, 
but by the entire community: in fact, solution Q* represents the social optimum, 
not the optimum for the tourism firms only (which would be Q=0).
Search for the efficient level of pollution.
CORRECTIONS
A. Direct control
The policy maker uses the power of law, by imposing a system of permits, 
licenses, or quotas of production. Despite their technical differences, the 
effect is similar, represented through setting a ceiling in manufacturing 
production, Q*.
Another form of direct control is through setting the standards of production.
B. Indirect control
In this case the policy maker changes the cost structure of the manufacturing good 
through price-based interventions. It can take the form of:
(a) taxes or subsidies on the quantity of the manufacturing good (Pigou Tax);
(b) charges or refund schemes based on the quantity of the externality generated.
externalities (4)
C. Private methods – Coase Theorem
In a perfectly competitive market and in the absence of transaction costs, the 
consequences of externalities are corrected by the market’s own mechanism, as 
long as property rights are clearly defined.
friendly and unfriendly tourism
Particularly important consumption externality between tourists and residents:
 Friendly tourism: the growing number of tourists, following the generic 
improvement of the city’s cultural capital and urban architecture, has a 
positive effect on residents, now living in a more attractive city, Tourism 
improves the quality of life of residents.
 Unfriendly tourism: the growing number of tourists does not allow 
residents to fully enjoy the attractions of the city. In this case a worsening in 
their standard of living is recorded.
The potential trade-off with the local population stems from the fact that the most 
important resource for tourism – the environment or, more generally, the territory 
– is to be shared with residents
The impact of tourism is often disaggregated into three categories: economic, 
sociocultural, and environmental effects.
Since tourism generally disrupts social, cultural, and environmental local systems, 
the non-economic impact often tends to be negative as a whole while 
economic effects are perceived as positive.
friendly and unfriendly tourism (2)
friendly and unfriendly tourism (3)
friendly and unfriendly tourism (4)
Examples of how local administrations use these instruments of intervention:
 Subsidies offered to airline companies (or TO) for each route opening at 
the local airport or each package holiday organized at the destination;
 Arrival fees paid by the tourists when they arrive at the destination.
The difficulties for the destination management are:
 The problem of finding the correct amount of the subsidy or of the tax;
 The selection of the types of tourism in which an intervention is necessary. 
In fact, some types of friendly and unfriendly tourism can coexist;
 The type of relationship depends both on the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the residents and on their employment characteristics 
Brau et al. (2009), Figini & Vici (2012), and Figini et al. (2009) study trade-offs and 
synergies in Rimini. The implication of this type of analysis for the policy maker is 
straightforward: it is possible to identify the best configuration of resources for 
tourists and residents among alternative scenarios and implement those 
investments that are welfare improving for both populations.
taxation in tourism
Taxation in the tourism sector is needed to: (i) finance public goods; (ii) reduce 
the negative externalities linked to tourism activity.
Since the public good is not used by firms and residents only, but also by tourists, 
the government has to determine: (a) the share of cost financed by taxes on 
profits; (b) the share that must be financed by taxes on income; (c) the share to 
be financed by taxes on tourists.
The population of the destination is composed of tourists (temporary citizens) 
and the local population (permanent residents).
The destination has to bear higher costs during the tourism season (e.g., trash 
collection, streets cleaning, police services, first-aid structures, etc.).
Tourism indirectly contributes to the local tax revenues due to the multiplier 
effect. Hence, one could conclude that no special taxes on tourists are needed. 
Moreover, if tourists have a holiday home in the destination, they might be called to 
directly contribute to local taxes, if specific taxes such as a property tax exist.
taxation in tourism (2)
Taxes on tourism would cash extra revenue with the scope of covering, all or in 
part, the extra costs that guests impose on their hosts
Taxes on tourists can be classified in:
 A fixed (lump-sum) tax paid by each tourist, which can be defined as a tax 
on arrivals;
 A tax proportional to the length of stay (an excise tax, or duty), which can 
be defined as a tax on the overnight stays;
 A sum proportional to the price paid (an ad valorem tax, or sales tax), 
which is computed as a percentage of the price paid by the tourist (this is 
the typical case of the Value Added Tax - VAT).
 In some cases, taxes on tourists can be progressive when their amount 
changes according to criteria of ability to pay (higher fees for hotels of a 
superior category).
It is easy to demonstrate that the tax revenue on tourists depends on the elasticity 
of demand.
taxation in tourism (3)
The tax modifies the relative price of tourism, having an effect on the spending 
decisions of tourists and altering the competitiveness of the destination.
 The more elastic the tourism demand, the greater the degree of substitutability 
with other competing destinations, the lower the tax revenue.
taxation in tourism (4)
Pros and cons on the introduction of taxes on tourists. 
Pros:
 Equity considerations (charge tourists with a share of the cost for the 
public services provided to them).
 Political considerations (they do not affect local voters).
 Low administrative costs and easiness of collection.
 Potential large source of revenue.
Cons:
 They are unpopular among tourists and tourism firms;
 Tourists already contribute through spending and the tourism multiplier;
Two-part tariff: T = F + tN.
By fine tuning F (tax on arrivals) and t (tax on overnight stays), the destination 
management could control, at least partially, the average length of stay of tourists’, 
thus choosing to encourage certain types of tourism rather than others.
By increasing F “hit and run” tourism is discouraged, diminishing externalities 
mainly associated with arrivals.
By increasing t it is possible to diminish the average length of stay, and the 
externalities mainly associated with tourists who stay too much.
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